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Abstract—Fuzzing is an automated application vulnerability
detection method. For genetic algorithm-based fuzzing, it can
mutate the seed files provided by users to obtain a number of in-
puts, which are then used to test the objective application in order
to trigger potential crashes. As shown in existing literature, the
seed file selection is crucial for the efficiency of fuzzing. However,
current seed selection strategies do not seem to be better than
randomly picking seed files. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a
novel and generic system, named SmartSeed, to generate seed files
towards efficient fuzzing. Specifically, SmartSeed is designed
based on a machine learning model to learn and generate high-
value binary seeds. We evaluate SmartSeed along with Amer-
ican Fuzzy Lop (AFL) on 12 open-source applications with the
input formats of mp3, bmp or flv. We also combine SmartSeed
with different fuzzing tools to examine its compatibility. From
extensive experiments, we find that SmartSeed has the following
advantages: First, it only requires tens of seconds to generate
sufficient high-value seeds. Second, it can generate seeds with
multiple kinds of input formats and significantly improves the
fuzzing performance for most applications with the same input
format. Third, SmartSeed is compatible to different fuzzing
tools. In total, our system discovers more than twice unique
crashes and 5,040 extra unique paths than the existing best seed
selection strategy for the evaluated 12 applications. From the
crashes found by SmartSeed, we discover 16 new vulnerabilities
and have received their CVE IDs.
Index Terms—Fuzzing, vulnerability detection, seed genera-
tion.
I. INTRODUCTION
An application bug refers to an error, failure or fault in a
computer system’s application (such as an operating system or
an image browser) that causes it to behave wrong. There are
several common application bug types such as buffer overflow,
integer overflow, use-after-free and so on.
Application bugs can cause enormous harms. An application
bug of Therac-25 resulted in the deaths of several patients
[12]. On June 4, 1996, an Ariane 5 rocket exploded just
forty seconds after its lift-off. It was caused by an application
error and lost the cargo which is worth $500 million [16].
In 2002, a study by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) estimated that application bugs costed U.S.
$59.5 billion loss a year [21]. Thus, application bugs can cause
both security problems and financial loss. It is important to
find and fix application bugs before they cause accidents or
are exploited by attackers.
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Over the decades, extensive research has been spent for
application bug detection. There are several existing staple
techniques in the academia and industry community, such as
dynamic taint analysis, symbolic execution and fuzzing.
Dynamic taint analysis is one of the most popular methods
to detect application bugs [13], [14]. It marks the data from
untrusted inputs as tainted. Then, the analysis tool traces
the tracks of all the tainted data when the application is
running. If the tainted data is used in some dangerous memory,
the analysis considers that a bug is detected. Dynamic taint
analysis has a low false positive rate by discovering bugs in
this way. However, since the analysis needs to add necessary
checks and traces the track of data when the application is
running, dynamic taint analysis has low execution efficiency.
Symbolic execution is a method of detecting bugs by
considering the whole process as solving constraints [22], [23].
It regards the input of an objective application as variable X
and tries to figure out the relationship between X and the
execution paths of the application. If a symbolic execution tool
runs into a branch statement, it will record two constraints, one
for each branch. Thus, when symbolic execution is finished,
users have a bunch of constraints, each of which corresponds
to an execution path of the objective application. If users want
to analyze one of the paths, they can solve the corresponding
constraint to get the corresponding X. In other words, users
obtain the corresponding input to test the target execution
path. Symbolic execution can accurately locate the bugs in
an application. However, it has a poor scalability. When the
objective application is large, the final equation becomes too
complicated to be solved for.
Fuzzing is one of the most effective methods to detect
crashes in applications. Different from other kinds of methods,
fuzzing dose not analyze which data or which code results in
the crashes. A fuzzing tool uses a simple yet efficient way
to detect crashes. It generates a great number of input files.
Then, the tool tests the objective application with these inputs
and detects whether the application behaves abnormally. If
the objective application happens to have a crash, the fuzzing
tool will store the input file that triggers the crash. In this
way, the fuzzing tool can detect the crashes and obtain the
input files which trigger crashes. Then, users can study these
input files to figure out whether the objective application has
bugs. However, since fuzzing does not consider how to trigger
crashes in an objective application, the whole process of
detecting crashes is blind. Fortunately, with the help of current
powerful computing capability, a fuzzing tool can use a large
number of input files to test an objective application so many
times within a short time. Therefore, fuzzing can potentially
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2find more crashes. In this paper, we focus on providing a better
seed set for fuzzing in order to discover more crashes.
Nowadays, modern application is much larger and more
complex, which makes it harder to adapt the fuzzing tools as
needed. To improve fuzzing efficiency, researchers typically
develop strategies for improvement following two directions:
design better fuzzing tools and use a better fuzzing seed set.
Following the first direction, there are a number of works fo-
cusing on designing better tools or improving current fuzzing
tools.
The fuzzing tools based on generation rules can learn the
input format of the objective application [6], [15], [19], [20],
[26]. Then, they can generate highly-structured input files
based on the input format. While other fuzzing tools spend
most time passing the format check, generation-based fuzzing
tools use the generated highly-structured files to test the
execution of applications. Thus, the generation-based fuzzing
tools are better at detecting the crashes of applications which
check the syntax features and the semantic rules of the input
files.
The fuzzing tools based on genetic algorithms do not con-
sider the input format of the objective application. According
to genetic algorithms, the tools mutate the initial input seed
set by byte flipping, cross over and so on. Then, in order to
discover crashes, the tools take the initial input seed set and the
mutated input files as the inputs of the applications. Since they
require little prior knowledge of the objective application, the
mutation-based fuzzing tools work pretty efficiently. However,
sometimes they get stuck because of the simple crash detection
strategy. To improve the efficiency of mutation-based fuzzing
tools, a number of researches combine the fuzzing tools
with other vulnerability detection technologies such as static
analysis, taint analysis and symbolic execution [4], [5], [7],
[17], [18]. There are several other researches indicating that
stimulating fuzzing tools to improve the coverage and test low-
frequency paths can improve the efficiency of fuzzing [2], [3],
[39], [40], where new fuzzing tools based on their viewpoints
are presented respectively.
The second direction of improving the efficiency of fuzzing
tools is to use a better seed set. Allen and Foote presented an
algorithm to consider the parameter selection and automated
selection of seed files [25]. The algorithm was implemented in
an open-source Basic Fuzzing Framework (BFF). Woo et al.
developed an analytic framework to evaluate 26 randomized
online scheduling algorithms that schedule a better seed to
fuzz a program [24]. In 2014, Rebert et al. evaluated six seed
selection strategies of fuzzing and showed how to select the
best selection strategy [1], etc.
However, the current seed selection strategies have many
deficiencies. For example, some strategies require a lot of
time to obtain the seed set [1]. What’s more, proved by our
experiments and the abovementioned work [1], the current
seed selection strategies perform unstable in many application
scenarios. Further, they do not have evident advantages than
random seed selection in many cases.
Therefore, to solve the problem of how to obtain a better
seed set for the applications without highly-structured input
format, we come up with the following heuristic questions:
Q1: Can we generate valuable seeds in a fast and effec-
tive manner? As we discussed before, many existing seed se-
lection strategies are slow, which is improper for fuzzing. More
importantly, existing solutions cannot yield effective seeds in
many scenarios. Therefore, to address these limitations, instead
of studying how to select seeds, our primary goal is to study
how to automatically generate effective seeds in a fast manner
leveraging state-of-the-art machine learning techniques.
Q2: Can we generate valuable seeds in a robust manner?
Based on the assumption that we have already figured out a
fast and effective seed generation strategy, it is still inefficient
if SmartSeed can only generate valuable seeds for some
specific input format or we have to retrain the model everytime
we want to fuzz a new application with the same input
format. Thus, our second goal is to design a robust seed
generation system. It should be able to generate valuable seeds
for multiple input formats. Moreover, we only need to train
the model once for any kind of input format. Then, the files
generated by this model can improve the fuzzing performance
for other applications with this input format.
Q3: Can we generate valuable seeds in a compatible
manner? It is unexpected for most fuzzing cases if our system
can only generate valuable seeds for specific fuzzing tools.
Therefore, to improve the compatibility, we aim to design
a seed generation strategy that can combine with different
fuzzing tools and improve their performance.
Following the above heuristic questions, in this paper, we
present a novel seed generation system named SmartSeed to
provide fuzzing tools with a better seed set as shown in Fig.
1.
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Fig. 1. Workflow of SmartSeed.
Basically, the workflow of SmartSeed consists of three
stages.
(1) Preparation. SmartSeed is a machine learning-based
system. To bootstrap SmartSeed, we need to prepare neces-
sary training data. Specifically, we collect some regular files
and employ them to fuzz some applications by commonly used
fuzzing tools like American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) [11]. Then, we
collect the input files that trigger unique crashes or new paths
as the training data. Note that, this step is only for collecting
necessary training data to bootstrap SmartSeed (which can
then be used to generate seeds for fuzzing many applications),
and can be easily implemented in practice. We show the details
in Section II-B.
(2) Model Construction. To make SmartSeed easily ex-
tendable in practice, we propose a transformation mechanism
3to encode the raw training data into generic matrices, which
are then being employed to construct a generative model for
seed generation. Leveraging the generative model, we generate
effective files as seeds.
(3) Fuzzing. Leveraging the seeds generated from the
constructed generative model, we use fuzzing tools (e.g., AFL)
to discover crashes of objective applications.
Note that the whole process can form a closed-loop. The
machine learning model can generate effective seed files to
help fuzzing tools discover new crashes and paths of objective
applications. Then, the training set of the machine learning
model in SmartSeed can be refined and enhanced with
complementary input files that trigger new crashes or paths.
With the help of SmartSeed, users can efficiently generate
a valuable input seed set. Our evaluation on 12 open source
applications demonstrates that SmartSeed significantly im-
proves the performance of fuzzing compared to state-of-the-art
seed selection strategies. The main contributions in this paper
can be summarized as follows:
• We present a machine learning-based system named
SmartSeed to generate valuable binary seed files for fuzzing
applications without of requiring highly-structured input for-
mat.
• Combining with AFL, we evaluate the seed files generated
by SmartSeed on 12 open source applications with the input
formats such as mp3, bmp or flv. Compared with state-of-
the-art seed selection strategies, SmartSeed finds 608 extra
unique crashes and 5,040 extra new paths than the existing
best strategy in total.
• We further combine SmartSeed with other popular
fuzzing tools to examine its compatibility: (1) combining with
AFLFast [2], SmartSeed is still the best seed strategy for
each application. (2) SmartSeed + honggfuzz [29] finds
the most crashes for five of the six objective applications.
(3) Among the evaluated seed selection/generation strategies,
only SmartSeed discovers crashes on ps2ts and mp42aac
when using VUzzer [3] as the fuzzing tool.
• We further analyze the seed sets generated by
SmartSeed and other state-of-the-art seed selection strate-
gies, and present several interesting findings to enlighten the
research of fuzzing. Visualized by t-SNE [30], the seed files
generated by SmartSeed are closer to the most valuable
files that trigger crashes or paths. Meanwhile, the files of
SmartSeed that trigger unique crashes cover the largest
area, which implies that the generated files are easier to be
mutated into more discrete valuable files. What’s more, we
realize that the execution speed is an improper indicator for
discovering crashes. However, the larger generation of seeds
helps fuzzing tools discover more unique paths. In total,
SmartSeed finds 23 unique vulnerabilities on 9 applications,
including 16 undiscovered ones. In the end, we open source
the code of SmartSeed, which is expected to facilitate future
fuzzing research 1.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the detail of SmartSeed. We evalu-
ate SmartSeed and existing state-of-the-art seed selection
1We also make our system publicly available to facilitate the research in
this area, which is available at: https://github.com/puppet-meteor/SmartSeed.
strategies on 12 applications, combine SmartSeed with
different fuzzing tools and analyze the results of vulnerabilities
discovered by different seed selection strategies in Section
III. In Section VIII, we further analyze the performance of
different seed selection strategies. In Section V, we make
some discussions and remark the limitation of our work. We
conclude the paper in Section VI. We provide more evaluation
results and summarize the related work with remarks in the
Supplementary File.
II. SMARTSEED
A. System Architecture
The core idea of SmartSeed is to construct a generative
model. Then, we use this model to fast generate valuable files
as the input seed set of fuzzing tools.
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Fig. 2. Architecture of SmartSeed.
As shown in Fig. 2, the whole architecture of SmartSeed
can be divided into 4 procedures:
(1) Training data collection: We introduce a criterion to
measure the value of input files and present a method to obtain
a training set for SmartSeed (Section II-B).
(2) Raw data conversion: To deal with files with unfixed
formats or unfixed file sizes, we convert the binary files of raw
training data to a uniform type of matrices (Section II-C).
(3) Model construction: Taking the matrices as training
data, we construct a seed generative model based on Wasser-
stein Generative Adversarial Networks (Section II-D).
(4) Inverse conversion: Based on the generative model, we
generate new matrices and convert them into proper input files,
which is the reverse process of Procedure (2) (Section II-E).
In our system, the employed fuzzing tool can be flexi-
ble, i.e., SmartSeed can be combined with most existing
mutation-based fuzzing tools. Since AFL is one of the most
efficient existing fuzzing tools [11], by default, we select AFL
to be the fuzzing tool in our implementation.
B. Training Data Collection
To construct a machine learning model for generating valu-
able seed files, we need to obtain an initial training set first.
Certainly, we are expected to ensure that an input file in the
training set is really valuable. Otherwise, SmartSeed may
not be able to learn useful features of “valuable input files”
and further generate such kind of files. Therefore, we first
clarify valuable input files. Specifically, in our implementation,
4we define valuable files as the input files that trigger unique
crashes or unique paths of applications. The reasons are as
follows: (1) since the ultimate goal of fuzzing is to detect more
crashes, the input files are considered as valuable if they can
trigger unique crashes of objective applications; (2) according
to the existing research [2], [3], [39], [40], increasing the
coverage and the depth of fuzzing paths are more likely to
increase the number of explored crashes. Hence, the files
triggering new paths are also valuable from this perspective.
Intuitively, we may employ existing seed selection strategies
to select a few valuable input files as the training set. However,
according to the existing research [1] and the results of
our experiments, current seed selection strategies seem to
be unreliable. Then, we realize that fuzzing tools such as
AFL will store the input files that trigger unique crashes
or paths, which faultlessly coincides with our needs. Thus,
we have the following training data collection strategy: we
can first use regular input files collected from the Internet to
fuzz the applications with the same input format. Then, we
gather the valuable input files, which trigger unique paths or
unique crashes of those applications, as the training set of
SmartSeed.
Note that, the above training set construction is not a
limitation of SmartSeed in practice. First, the criterion for
determining a valuable input file is that it can trigger a crash
or a new path, which can be easily implemented by AFL in
practice. Second, for the applications with the same input
formats, such as the applications that deal with mp3, we
can fuzz multiple applications simultaneously to facilitate the
training set construction process, and meanwhile increase the
multiformity of the input files in the training set. Third, since
we can parallelly run many fuzzing procedures, we can further
accelerate the training set collection process, e.g., we can
collect more than 20,000 valuable files for one kind of input
format within a week. Therefore, we can construct the training
set for SmartSeed easily and fast in practice.
By collecting a training set in this way, we further have the
following advantages:
• We can accurately evaluate the value of the input files.
The input files in the training set can certainly detect unique
paths or trigger unique crashes of some applications. Thus,
they carry useful features for learning.
• During the fuzzing process, we realize that the formats of
many files that trigger crashes or new paths are corrupted.
We analyze the reason is that files are randomly mutated
according to the employed genetic algorithm, and it seems that
the corrupted files are more likely to trigger unique crashes and
paths. However, it is difficult to gather a number of corrupted
files from the Internet, while SmartSeed can be trained to
generate many corrupted files as expected.
C. Raw Data Conversion
To construct a generic seed generation model, we propose a
mechanism to convert the raw input files in the training set to
a uniform type of matrices. The reasons for conducting such
conversion are as follows.
First, one of our objectives is to make SmartSeed deal
with multiple input formats and unfixed file sizes. However, it
is inconvenient to adjust the data read mode for different kinds
of and different sizes of files. Thus, we should figure out a
uniform method to read data from the training set. Second,
the formats of many files in the training set are corrupted.
A normal reading manner, such as reading a bmp picture
file as a three-dimensional matrix, may not work in many
application scenarios. Third, based on the knowledge that
machine learning algorithms are better to work on quantitative
values of matrices rather than some random value types, we
are expected to find a way that can convert multiple types of
files to a uniform type of matrices. Finally, we expect to give
expression to the magic bytes in the binary form of training
files. Because in this way a machine learning model would
be easier to learn the features of magic bytes that control the
code execution paths. Thus, the files should be read in binary
form and are expected to be converted to uniform matrices.
Below, we introduce the main procedures of raw training
data conversion, which are shown in Fig. 3.
(1) Since all the files can be read in binary form, we can
read the binary form of any type of file and get a binary string.
(2) To handle the problem of how to recognize the end of
the binary string, we encode the string with Base64. Thus, we
have the string formed by 64 kinds of characters and “=”, e.g.,
the character string shown in Fig. 3.
(3) Now, since a character string may have 65 different
characters, for convenience, we convert the characters of
Base64 and “=” to the numbers (from 0 to 64). Thus, we
obtain a string of numbers as shown in Fig. 3. The encoding
mechanism for such conversion is shown in Fig. 4.
(4) To economize the number of elements in a matrix,
we convert every six numbers of the number string to a
large number of the decimal system. Then, we normalize the
numbers of the decimal system to [0, 0.75418890624] (since
656 − 1 = 75, 418, 890, 624) for the accuracy and efficiency
of the model training. Finally, add 0 at the end of the matrix
if there is an empty element, as shown in Fig. 3.
Since the larger numbers will be stored in the scientific
notation form and lose some veracity, one element of the
matrix can only store one number in the decimal system that is
converted from six numbers (from 0 to 64) at most. However,
users can choose the number less than six if the file size is
small in practical application scenarios. Note that the fewer
numbers are converted into one large number, the easier a
machine learning model learns the features of input files. We
convert 6 numbers in our experiments in order to test the most
difficult situation for the machine learning model.
Leveraging the above method, we can convert raw files with
corrupted formats or unfixed file sizes into a uniform type of
matrices. This can significantly improve the extendability and
compatibility of SmartSeed.
D. Model Construction
One of the best existing generative models is the Gener-
ative Adversarial Networks (GAN) model, which has been
widely used for unsupervised learning since 2014 [8]. GAN
is a new framework consisting of a generative model and a
discriminative model. The generative model tries to generate
5input file
(1)+(2)
17, 36, 49, 22, 64, 16,| 20, 64, 64, 64, 64, 9,| 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 1,| 
8, 64, 64, 16, 48, 64,| 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64,| 64, 64, 64, 32, 64, 
10,| 27, 54, 57, 13, 25, 23,| 17, 33, 17, 6, 5, 52,| 24, 16, 32, 64, 64, 
64,| 64, 12, 64, 64, 33, 36,| 29, 23, 9, 33, 29, 6,| 37, 47, 27, 32, 64, 
63,| 63, 31, 14, 54, 17, 26,| 7, 10, 48, 16, 64, 5,| 29, 54, 37, 36, 29, 
6,| 32, 64, 16, 8, 16, 64,| 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64,| 64, 64, 1, 38, 33, 
37,| 26, 22, 29, 40, 29, 64,| 1, 64, 29, 40, 64, 64,| 
                       ..             
    ..   ,  8, 48, 32, 57, 7, 37,| 43, 55, 39, 37, 61, 63,| 22, 44, 
63, 60, 46, 63,| 63, 4, 7, 16, 1, 37,| 30, 39, 63, 52, 63, 54,| 25, 53, 
13, 61, 7, 61,| 6, 20, 62, 41, 6, 19,| 51, 45, 17, 29, 61, 7,| 28, 41, 
61, 30, 34, 29,| 25, 41, 18, 18, 10, 19,| 32, 64, 33, 5, 2, 14,| 3, 62, 
8, 23, 28, 21,| 55, 18, 40, 22, 5, 14,| 40, 40, 42, 4, 16, 19,| 27, 16, 
53, 31, 35, 10,| 19, 60, 20, 40, 13, 17,| 51, 55, 30, 16, 0, 0,
number string
[0.20381116876, 0.24366103069,  , 0.57587940888, 0.32473622954]
[0.12302726640, 0.48642124958,  , 0.69644964615, 0.70967406341]
         .                              .
[0.72507856897, 0.60277707678,   , 0.37012003172, 0.18467631257]
[0.49575565680, 0.64917978966,      ...            .., 0, 0]
[0, 0,                                   ..., 0, 0]
                    .                   .
[0, 0,                   .                .., 0, 0]
64×64 matrix
(4)
RkxWAQUAAAAJAAAAABIAAQwA
AAAAAAAAAgAKb25NZXRhRGF0Y
QgAAAAMAAhkdXJhdGlvbgA//
fO2RaHKwQAFd2lkdGgAQIQAAAA
AAAAABmhlaWdodABAdoAA   
                  .  
Iwg5Hlr3nl9/Ws/8u//EHQBlen/0/
2Z1N9H9GU+pGTztRd9Hcp9eidZp
SSKTgAhFCOD+IXcV3SoWFOooqE
QTbQ1fjKT8UoNRz3eQ==
(3)
character string
Fig. 3. Training Data Conversion.
"A":64,     "N":13,     "a":26,     "n":39,     "0":52,   
"B":1,       "O":14,     "b":27,     "o":40,     "1":53, 
"C":2,       "P":15,      "c":28,     "p":41,     "2":54, 
"D":3,      "Q":16,      "d":29,     "q":42,     "3":55,   
"E":4,       "R":17,      "e":30,     "r":43,      "4":56, 
"F":5,       "S":18,       "f":31,     "s":44,     "5":57,
"G":6,       "T":19,      "g":32,     "t":45,     "6":58, 
"H":7,      "U":20,      "h":33,     "u":46,     "7":59, 
"I":8,        "V":21,      "i":34,      "v":47,     "8":60,
"J":9,       "W":22,      "j":35,     "w":48,     "9":61,
"K":10,     "X":23,      "k":36,     "x":49,      "+":62,
"L":11,     "Y":24,       "l":37,     "y":50,      "/":63,
"M":12,    "Z":25,      "m":38,    "z":51,      "=":0,
Fig. 4. Convert Base64 Character to the Number from 0 to 64.
fake data that are similar to the real data in the training set,
while the discriminative model tries to distinguish the fake data
from the real data. Two models alternatively work together
to train each other and further to improve each other. As a
result, the generative model will generate data that are too
real to be distinguished by the discriminative model. Usually,
the generative model provided by GAN can generate more
realistic data than other algorithms. However, it is unstable to
train a GAN model. GAN also has many problems such as
model collapse.
Radford et al. tried multiple combinations of machine learn-
ing schemes to construct better generative and discriminative
models for GAN. They presented the Deep Convolutional
GAN (DCGAN) model [9]. DCGAN can generate more real-
istic data than standard GAN and is much easier for training.
However, it still has many problems including model collapse.
In 2017, Arjovsky et al. presented the Wasserstein GAN
(WGAN) model [10]. Unlike other GAN models, WGAN
improves the stability of learning a lot. It is also much easier
to train a WGAN model. In addition, WGAN can solve the
problems of GAN like mode collapse in most application
scenarios.
Hence, for our purpose, we employ WGAN to learn the
characteristics of valuable files and then generate valuable
seed files. Our selection further has the following benefits.
First, WGAN can learn the features of the training set by
itself. Thus, we do not need to pay attention to the feature
selection, which is very time-efficient. Another advantage is
that we can freely choose an appropriate machine learning
model as the generative model and the discriminative model
of WGAN. We analyze that Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP)
focuses more on every quantitative value in a matrix, while
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) pays more attention to
the global features of a matrix. Then, in order to construct a
better model, we test the performance of both neural network
models. For our application, MLP does work better than CNN
as the generative and discriminative models of WGAN. It
also requires less training time. Therefore, we choose MLP
as the model in SmartSeed. Now, based on the collected
training data, we can train a generative model for valuable
seed generation.
Note that, a detailed description of WGAN can be found
in [10]. Since our focus in this paper is to construct a GAN-
based efficient fuzzing framework and further demonstrates
its effectiveness, we leave the research of developing an
improved GAN model as the future work. Furthermore, users
of SmartSeed can select an alternative machine learning
model as the generative model in terms of the application
scenarios.
E. Inverse Conversion
In this subsection, we introduce how to employ the gener-
ative model of SmartSeed to obtain an effective input seed
set. Since the training set of SmartSeed is a number of
matrices, the generative model is trained to generate similar
matrices. To obtain binary input files for fuzzing, we have to
convert the generated matrices to binary files. Thus, we do the
reverse of the abovementioned procedures in Section II-C.
To be specific, the fist step is to restore the [0,
0.75418890624] elements of the matrix to large numbers of the
decimal system. Second, convert each number of the decimal
system to six numbers (from 0 to 64), i.e., the number string
as shown in Fig. 3. Then, convert the numbers (from 0 to
64) to the characters of Base64 and “=”, i.e., the character
string as shown in Fig. 3. Finally, decode the character string
of Base64 into a binary file and store it locally. Thereout, we
obtain the input files for the following fuzzing.
III. IMPLEMENTATION & EVALUATION
A. Datasets
To evaluate the performance of SmartSeed, we employ
12 open-source linux applications with input formats of mp3,
bmp or flv as shown in Table I.
We choose these applications mainly for three reasons.
First, they can be fuzzed with the files without high-
structured formats, which are the focus of genetic algorithm-
based fuzzing as well as SmartSeed.
Second, these applications are popular and important open-
source programs. For instance, mp3gain is a popular tool to
analyze and adjust the volume of mp3 files. From SourceForge
[32], mp3gain for linux are downloaded 639 times on
average per week and mp3gain for Windows are downloaded
10,877 times on average per week. magick is the main
6program of ImageMagick, whose mirror has been collected
1.7k times on github. bmp2tiff is the conversion tool of
libtiff, which is employed in the experiments of many
other researches as a fuzzing dataset [31]. As for flv, avconv
and ps2ts are the popular media tools provided by libav
and tstools, respectively.
Third, these applications have different code logic and
functionalities, and thus are sufficiently representative. For
example, magick is used to browse bmp, sam2p is used
to convert bmp into eps, bmp2tiff is used to convert bmp
into tiff, and exiv2 is a cross-platform C++ library and
a command line utility to manage image metadata. All the
four applications are provided by different groups. Although
mp42aac is a tool in Bento4 that deals with mp4 files, we
also use SmartSeed to generate flv files as the initial seed
set to fuzz it. This is mainly for evaluating the robustness of
SmartSeed.
B. SmartSeed Implementation
To implement SmartSeed, the first step is to collect
the training set. As we mentioned before, we fuzz some
applications and collect the valuable input files.
In consideration of the training efficiency, if the size of
training files is too large, we have to use a big matrix to store
the file, which leads to longer training time. On the contrary,
it is hard to collect small files for meaningful multimedia data
with formats such as mp3 and flv. What’s more, small files may
not carry enough features for machine learning. Therefore, we
need to determine a proper size for the employed training files.
Considering both the training efficiency and the training
effectiveness, we prefer to employ files less than 17KB to
construct the generative model of SmartSeed. To accom-
modate files with size of 17KB or less, 64× 64 matrices are
sufficient (whose maximum storage is 18KB). On the other
hand, it would be hard for SmartSeed to learn meaningful
features from too sparse matrices, e.g., a matrix with more than
35% of its elements are null, since they carry less valuable
information. Therefore, we finally decide to collect valuable
input files with size between 12KB and 17KB as the training
data in our implementation. This setting can ensure that the
training rate is fast, make it easy to collect valuable files and
TABLE I
OBJECTIVE APPLICATIONS.
Target Version Release Time Heat
mp3
mp3gain 1.5.2.r2 2010-08 639 downloads/week
ffmpeg 3.4 2018-02 10.6k collections
mpg123 1.25.6 2017-08 1,720 downloads/week
mpg321 0.3.2 2012-03 78 downloads/week
bmp
magick 7.0.7 2017-10 1.7k collections
bmp2tiff 3.8.2 2007-03 52 collections
exiv2 0.26 2017-05 67 collections
sam2p 0.49.4 2017-12 10 collections
flv
avconv 12.2 2017-09 576 collections
flvmeta 1.2.1 2016-08 67 collections
ps2ts 1.13 2015-11 70 collections
mp42aac 1.5.1.0 2017-09 443 collections
meanwhile ensure sufficient information is carried, i.e., seek
a balance between efficiency and utility.
Note that easy extendability is one of SmartSeed’s advan-
tages. The size of the input files in the training set is adjustable
in practice. If users want to use smaller files as the training set,
they may convert fewer characters of Base64 to the number of
the decimal system or use smaller matrices. On the other hand,
if users want to use files with bigger size to train SmartSeed,
they may employ a bigger matrix to store the string of Base64.
Now, we are ready to collect the training data. The col-
lection processes are conducted on 16 same virtual machines
with an Intel i7 CPU, 4.5GB memory and a Ubuntu 16.04
LTS system and last for a week for each input format. For
applications with the mp3 format, we employ AFL to fuzz
mp3gain and ffmpeg, and collect 20,646 valuable input
files with size 12KB to 17KB as the training set. For bmp, we
use AFL to fuzz magick and bmp2tiff. Then, we collect
24,101 input files as the training set. For applications with the
flv format, we employ AFL to fuzz avconv and flvmeta.
Then, we collect 21,688 input files between 12KB and 17KB
that discover new paths or unique crashes.
Based on the collected training data, we construct the
prototype of SmartSeed. The core function of SmartSeed
is implemented in Python 2.7. The code of the WGAN
model is implemented in Pytorch 0.3.0. We use Adam as
the optimization algorithm of the WGAN model. Then, we
test several times to decide the hyper-parameters, such as how
many times to train the discriminative model after training the
generative model. During the training process, we decrease the
learning rate of the optimization algorithm from 0.5 × 10−3
to 0.5 × 10−12 inch by inch. It takes us around 38 hours to
train the generative model of SmartSeed for 100,000 times
on a server with 2 Intel Xeon E5-2640 v4 CPUs running at
2.40GHz, 64 GB memory, 4TB HDD and a GeForce GTX
1080TI GPU card. Note that others may not need to train the
models for 100,000 times.
C. Effectiveness
1) Comparison Strategies: To compare the performance of
SmartSeed with state-of-the-art seed selection strategies, we
implement the following methods.
random. Under this scheme, we randomly select files from
the regular input files that are usually downloaded from the
Internet. Because this is the most common seed selection
strategy in practice, we take random as the baseline seed
strategy in our experiments.
AFL-result. Under this scheme, we randomly select
seeds from the saved input files of AFL, which are also the files
used for training SmartSeed. Since these files are certainly
to either trigger unique crashes or new paths during the fuzzing
process, they may yield an outstanding performance as a seed
set for fuzzing tools. As our system is learnt from these files,
AFL-result can serve as the baseline of SmartSeed.
peachset. The fuzzing framework Peach provides a seed
selection tool named MinSet [28], whose workflow is as
follows: (1) MinSet inspects the coverage of each file in
the full set which might be collected from the Internet; (2)
7it sorts the files by their coverage in the descending order;
(3) MinSet initializes the seed set as an empty set, which is
denoted by peachset; (4) MinSet checks the coverage of
files in order. If a file improves the coverage of peachset,
the file will be added to peachset.
hotset. hotset contains the files that discover the most
unique crashes and paths within t time [1]. To construct
hotset, first, use each file, that may be collected from the
Internet, as the initial seed set to fuzz an application for t
seconds. Second, sort the files in the descending order by the
number of discovered crashes and paths. Third, select the top-k
files to constitute hotset. In our experiments, we fuzz each
file for 240 seconds.
AFL-cmin. In order to select a better seed set, AFL pro-
vides a tool named AFL-cmin. The core idea of AFL-cmin
is to filter out the redundant files that inspect already discov-
ered paths. AFL-cmin tries to find the smallest subset of the
full set, which still has the same coverage as the full set.
2) Results: Now, we evaluate the effectiveness of different
seed generation/selection strategies. For the schemes that need
an initial dataset to bootstrap the seed selection process, we
collect a dataset consisting of 4,600 input files for each input
format from the Internet. For SmartSeed, we generate seeds
based on its generative model. All the following experiments
are conducted on same machines with an Intel i7 CPU, 4.5GB
memory and a Ubuntu 16.04 LTS system.
Seed Generation Speed. First, we evaluate the seed gen-
eration speed of different strategies. The results are shown in
Table II, from which we have the following observations.
(1) As we discussed before, random simply picks a seed
set at random from the initial dataset. AFL-result follows
a similar strategy except for randomly picking a seed set from
the saved input files of AFL. Therefore, they are the fastest
ones for selecting seeds and are scalable.
(2) SmartSeed employs a generative model to generate
seeds which is also very fast and scalable. It only takes 12
seconds to generate 100 seed files and 240 seconds to generate
2,000 seed files, exhibiting a linear increasing correlationship
between the time consumption and the number of generated
seeds.
(3) For the coverage-based seed selection strategies
peachset and AFL-cmin, they are relatively slow. For
instance, to generate 500 seed files, it takes peachset and
AFL-cmin 2,500 seconds and 874 seconds, respectively. This
is mainly because they have to check the coverage of each
file. Furthermore, since coverage-based strategies are hard to
increase the number of the selected files by increasing the
size of the initial file set, we have to use the screening tools
to filtrate multiple initial file sets containing different files to
obtain enough selected files.
(4) For hotset, it is extremely slow. For instance,
hotset requires >2,000 min to select seeds from 500 files
in our experiments. This is mainly because hotset has to
use each single file as the seed set to fuzz an application for
sufficient time, which is very time consuming.
In practical fuzzing applications, O(100) number of seeds
are usually sufficient to bootstrap fuzzing tools. For instance,
3 seed files are sufficient for bootstrapping VUzzer by default
[3]. Therefore, based on the results in Table II, SmartSeed
is very efficient in generating seeds.
Fuzzing Effectiveness. Now, we evaluate the effectiveness
of the seeds obtained by different strategies. In our experi-
ments, we employ each seed generation/selection strategy to
obtain a seed set consisting of 100 files and then feed the
seed set to AFL. Note that it is sufficient and effective to
use 100 files as the seed set to guide fuzzing tools, which is
analyzed in detail in the Supplementary File due to the space
limitations. To control irrelevant variables, we operate all the
fuzzing experiments on the same virtual machines for 72 hours
with an Intel i7 CPU, 4.5G memory and a Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
system.
The primary goal of fuzzing is to discover crashes. Thus, we
use the number of unique crashes found by each seed strategy
as the main evaluation criterion. Furthermore, as shown in
many existing researches [2], [3], [39], [40], a higher coverage
can improve the fuzzing performance. Therefore, our second
evaluation criterion is the number of discovered unique paths
during the same time. The results are shown in Table III. We
can deduce the following conclusions from Table III.
(1) For discovering unique crashes, SmartSeed is very
effective and performs the best in almost all the evaluation
scenarios. When fuzzing mp3 applications, SmartSeed dis-
covers 24 more crashes than the existing best solution for
mp3gain, and discovers more than twice unique crashes
than the existing best solution for mpg123 and mpg321.
When fuzzing bmp applications, SmartSeed also yields
the best performance. Again, when fuzzing flv applications,
SmartSeed discovers the most crashes in total among the
evaluated solutions. An exception is flvmeta, on which
AFL-cmin discovers the most crashes. After viewing the the
saved valuable files of flvmeta, we conjecture the reason
is that normal flv files are more likely to find crashes of
flvmeta, while SmartSeed tends to generate corrupted
files that are more likely to find paths of flvmeta, since
many of its training data are corrupted.
(2) For triggering unique paths, again, SmartSeed is very
effective. Among the 12 evaluated applications, SmartSeed
discovers the most paths on 8 ones, the second-most paths
on one and the third-most paths on three ones. Specifically,
for mp3, SmartSeed discovers nearly twice unique paths
than other fuzzing strategies except for ffmpeg. It also out-
performs other strategies when fuzzing magick, bmp2tiff
and sam2p. Both SmartSeed and AFL-result perform
well when fuzzing flv applications.
(3) Interestingly, for mpg123 and magick, SmartSeed
TABLE II
SEED GENERATION SPEED.
seed strategy 100 seeds 500 seeds 2,000 seeds
SmartSeed 12 sec 60 sec 240 sec
random 0.5 sec 0.5 sec 0.5 sec
AFL-result 0.5 sec 0.5 sec 0.5 sec
peachset 500 sec 2,500 sec 10,000 sec
hotset >400 min >2,000 min >8,000 min
AFL-cmin 174.8 sec 874 sec 3,496 sec
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UNIQUE CRASHES AND PATHS OF EACH OBJECTIVE APPLICATION DISCOVERED BY DIFFERENT FUZZING STRATEGIES.
SmartSeed+AFL random+AFL AFL-result+AFL peachset+AFL hotset+AFL AFL-cmin+AFL
unique
crashes
unique
paths
unique
crashes
unique
paths
unique
crashes
unique
paths
unique
crashes
unique
paths
unique
crashes
unique
paths
unique
crashes
unique
paths
mp3gain 153 1,742 87 936 128 876 129 841 119 989 95 698
ffmpeg 0 1,592 0 1,925 0 1,671 0 1,129 0 1,178 0 1,306
mpg123 78 2,154 0 1,183 0 1,001 0 1,405 0 1,172 0 1,589
mpg321 204 1,060 40 766 13 187 37 748 16 128 72 441
magick 238 3,374 0 697 0 1,149 0 196 0 722 0 265
bmp2tiff 56 714 21 466 34 684 32 534 21 583 21 498
exiv2 66 1,549 20 1,413 38 2,293 55 1,096 57 1,593 27 1,202
sam2p 50 1,322 21 468 36 719 25 520 28 479 12 363
avconv 0 4,315 0 1,873 0 4,191 0 1,994 0 1,976 0 2,200
flvmeta 90 1,259 68 886 87 1,295 100 1,104 98 1,013 104 1,128
ps2ts 43 1,692 4 1,381 14 1,740 26 1,472 7 1,419 19 1,742
mp42aac 118 658 80 329 102 585 84 571 53 338 70 453
total 1,096 21,431 341 12,323 452 16,391 488 11,610 399 11,590 420 11,885
average 91.3 1,785.9 28.4 1,026.9 37.7 1,365.9 40.7 967.5 33.25 965.8 35 990.4
+ AFL is the only one that can discover crashes among
the evaluated strategies. Specifically, it discovers 78 unique
crashes on mpg123 (mainly bus errors) and 238 crashes on
magick (mainly segmentation faults). This again suggests
that SmartSeed is very effective in practice. Moreover,
for ffmpeg and avconv, no strategy finds any crash. We
conjecture the reasons are: these two applications are very
robust and/or our fuzzing time might be too short to trigger
crashes.
(4) For random, AFL-result, peachset, hotset and
AFL-cmin, it is difficult to say which is better. In total, the
unique crashes and paths discovered by them are around [340,
490] and [11,000, 16,500], respectively. peachset seems to
perform better than others in more scenarios. However, even
for the naive solution random, it outperforms others in many
applications. For instance, random discovers more crashes
than peachset and AFL-result for mpg321, discovers
more crashes for mpg321 and mp42aac and the same
number of crashes for bmp2tiff compared with hotset,
and discovers more crashes for sam2p and mp42aac and
the same number of crashes for bmp2tiff compared with
AFL-cmin, which is unexpected.
In summary, compared with state-of-the-art seed selection
strategies, SmartSeed is more stable and yields much better
performance. In total, SmartSeed + AFL discovers 124.6%
more unique crashes (i.e., 608 extra unique crashes) and 30.7%
more unique paths (i.e., 5,040 extra unique paths) than the
existing best seed strategy.
We also visualize the growth of unique crashes for each
strategy. The results are shown in Fig. 5, from which we have
the following observations.
(1) SmartSeed is very efficient, e.g., when fuzzing
mpg321, the unique crashes discovered by SmartSeed in
10 hours are more than the crashes that discovered by other
schemes in 72 hours.
(2) For existing seed selection strategies, they exhibit similar
performance during the fuzzing processes and their curves
usually mix together. This result is also consistent with the
results shown in Table III.
(3) As indicated by the results in Fig. 5, it takes time for
each curve to become stable, which implies that sufficient
time is necessary to enable these strategies to find crashes.
This observation is also meaningful for us to conduct fuzzing
evaluation in a proper manner.
In summary, compared with state-of-the-art seed selection
strategies, SmartSeed performs pretty better than other seed
strategies for generating valuable files with multiple input
formats. It not only can discover unique crashes faster, but
also can discover more.
Number of Seeds vs. Fuzzing Performance. To figure
out the relationship between the number of seeds and fuzzing
performance, we conduct the comparative experiments in the
Supplementary File due to the space limitations. The results
show there is no distinct connection between the number of
seeds and fuzzing performance, while it is OK to use 100 seeds
as the initial set to guide fuzzing tools in our experiments.
D. Compatibility
In this subsection, we examine the compatibility and
extendibility of SmartSeed. Specifically, we combine
SmartSeed with existing popular fuzzing tools and evaluate
its performance.
1) Fuzzing Tools: In this evaluation, in addition to AFL,
we consider the following fuzzing tools.
AFLFast [2]. AFLFast is a fuzzing tool based on AFL.
By using a power schedule to guide the tool towards low-
frequency paths, AFLFast can detect much more paths with
the same execution counts than AFL.
honggfuzz [29]. honggfuzz is an easy-to-use fuzzing
tool provided by Google. Similar to AFL, honggfuzz modifies
the input files from the initial seed set and use them for
fuzzing. In addition, honggfuzz provides powerful process
state analysis by leveraging ptrace.
VUzzer [3]. VUzzer is a fuzzing tool that focuses on
increasing the coverage. By prioritizing the files mutated from
the input files that reach deep paths, VUzzer can explore more
and deeper paths. Unlike AFL, AFLFast and honggfuzz who
count the edge-coverage, VUzzer uses a dynamic binary in-
strumentation tool named PIN to calculate the block coverage,
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Fig. 5. Number of crashes over 72 hours. X-axis: time (over 72 hours). Y-axis: the number of unique crashes.
i.e., VUzzer computes the percent of discovered unique blocks
to measure the coverage of an objective application.
2) Results: For comparison with SmartSeed, we also
consider to combine random and AFL-result with the
considered fuzzing tools. Specifically, we first employ each
seed strategy to obtain 100 seed files, and then feed each
fuzzing tool with these seeds. For the objective applications,
we use mpg123, mpg321, magick, sam2p, ps2ts and
mp42aac. All the fuzzing evaluations last for 72 hours and
are conducted on same virtual machines with the same settings
as in Section III-C.
We show the results in Table IV. Note that, since hong-
gfuzz failed to build sam2p and mp42aac by its compiler
hfuzz-cc, we cannot count the discovered unique paths for
these two applications when we use honggfuzz to fuzz them.
From Table IV, we have the following observations.
(1) With respect to the discovered unique crashes, when
combining with AFLFast, SmartSeed + AFLFast discov-
ers the most crashes in all the evaluation scenarios. When
combining with honggfuzz, SmartSeed discovers over twice
of crashes on mpg321 than the other strategies and is the only
one that guides honggfuzz to discover crashes on magick.
While on mpg123, sam2p and mp42aac, all the three seed
strategies perform similar. When combining with VUzzer,
SmartSeed discovers the most crashes on mpg321, sam2p,
ps2ts and mp42aac. As for mpg123 and magick, no
crash is discovered by the evaluated strategies. All the above
results demonstrate that SmartSeed is compatible with ex-
isting popular fuzzing tools, and meanwhile is very effective
in fuzzing.
(2) With respect to the discovered unique paths (or coverage
when combining with VUzzer), SmartSeed also yields the
best performance in most of the evaluation scenarios. Specifi-
cally, SmartSeed discovers the most unique paths in all the
cases when combining with AFLFast. As for honggfuzz, ex-
cept of the error cases (sam2p and mp42aac), SmartSeed
discovers more unique paths than others for mpg123 and
ps2ts. For mpg321, all the strategies discover the same
number of paths. When combining with VUzzer, we use the
criteria as in [3], i.e., we count the block coverage rate instead
of unique paths. From the results, all the strategies discover
similar number of paths on mp3 and bmp applications, while
SmartSeed yields a much better performance on flv appli-
cations.
Overall, SmartSeed exhibits a good compatibility when
combing with different fuzzing tools. Meanwhile, the seeds
generated by SmartSeed can significantly improve the per-
formance of existing popular fuzzing tools.
E. Vulnerability Results
To figure out unique vulnerabilities, we recompile the eval-
uated applications with AddressSanitizer [50] and use
the discovered files of SmartSeed, which triggered crashes,
to test the applications. The results are shown in Table V, from
which we can learn the following observations.
(1) Although we only run each fuzzing process for 72 hours,
from the crashes discovered by SmartSeed, we find 23
unique vulnerabilities in total, and 16 of them are previously
unreported. We submit them to CVE [49] and have acquired
the corresponding CVE IDs. This proves that our system is
not only efficient but also can guide fuzzing tools to find more
undiscovered vulnerabilities.
(2) In total, we discover 9 types of vulnerabilities. This
demonstrates that our system does not limit on specific kinds
of vulnerabilities, while SmartSeed can guide fuzzing tools
to discover various vulnerabilities.
In summary, SmartSeed is efficient at discovering various
types of vulnerabilities in practice. Note that recently, the
state-of-the-art fuzzer CollAFL [31] also has fuzzed exiv2
with the same version and mpg123 with a close version
(ours is 1.25.6, while they used mpg123 with version 1.25.0)
for 200 hours, and discovered 13 and 1 new vulnerabilities,
respectively. Nevertheless, we can still discover new and
unreported vulnerabilities on these two applications using
SmartSeed with only 72 hours of fuzzing. This implies
that SmartSeed is effective to guide fuzzing tools to find
undiscovered vulnerabilities.
Then, to evaluate the ability of different fuzzing strategies
on discovering unique vulnerabilities, we use input files of
all six fuzzing strategies that trigger crashes to test the appli-
cations recompiled by AddressSanitizer [50]. Since no
fuzzing strategy discovers any crash on ffmpeg or avconv
and the assignment team of CVE [49] dose not regard the crash
on flvmeta as a vulnerability, we do not show the results
of them. The results are shown in Table VI, from which we
can learn the following observations.
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TABLE IV
UNIQUE CRASHES AND PATHS OF EACH OBJECTIVE APPLICATION USING DIFFERENT FUZZING TOOLS.
mpg123 mpg321 magick sam2p ps2ts mp42aac
unique
crashes
coverage unique
crashes
coverage unique
crashes
coverage unique
crashes
coverage unique
crashes
coverage unique
crashes
coverage
SmartSeed + AFL 78 2,154 204 1,060 238 3,374 50 1,322 43 1,692 118 658
random + AFL 0 1,183 40 766 0 697 21 468 4 1,381 80 329
AFL-result + AFL 0 1,001 13 187 0 1,149 36 719 14 1,740 102 585
SmartSeed + AFLFast 148 2,526 161 758 14 2,543 59 1,611 179 2,026 86 592
random + AFLFast 0 1,333 27 215 1 1,567 27 574 75 1,779 68 569
AFL-result + AFLFast 0 1,241 12 194 0 1,090 53 724 158 1,787 48 360
SmartSeed + honggfuzz 0 2,776 22 375 3 5,442 10 error 3 1,132 1 error
random + honggfuzz 1 534 9 375 0 4,707 9 error 0 1,069 0 error
AFL-result + honggfuzz 0 534 4 375 0 5,948 8 error 3 1,070 1 error
SmartSeed + VUzzer 0 10% 1,590 17% 0 39% 16 19% 3 14% 30 8%
random + VUzzer 0 12% 1,261 18% 0 39% 7 19% 0 8% 0 1%
AFL-result + VUzzer 0 12% 1,483 17% 0 39% 2 18% 0 8% 0 1%
TABLE V
VULNERABILITIES FOUND BY SMARTSEED .
target type vulnerability
mp3gain global-buffer-overflow CVE-2017-12911;
CVE-2017-14410;
CVE-2018-10781(+);
CVE-2018-10783(+);
CVE-2018-10784(+);
mp3gain segmentation violation CVE-2017-14406;
mp3gain stack-buffer-overflow CVE-2018-10777(+);
mp3gain memcpy-param-overlap CVE-2018-10782(+);
mpg123 integer overflow CVE-2018-10789(+);
mpg321 heap-buffer-overflow CVE-2018-10786(+);
magick memory leak CVE-2017-11754;
bmp2tiff heap-buffer-overflow CVE-2018-10779(+);
bmp2tiff segmentation violation CVE-2014-9330;
exiv2 heap-buffer-overflow CVE-2017-17723;
CVE-2018-10780(+);
exiv2 stack-overflow CVE-2017-14861;
sam2p heap-buffer-overflow CVE-2018-10792(+);
CVE-2018-10793(+);
ps2ts heap-buffer-overflow CVE-2018-10787(+);
CVE-2018-10788(+);
mp42aac memory access violation CVE-2018-10791(+);
mp42aac buffer overflow CVE-2018-10790(+);
CVE-2018-10785(+);
(1) For the already existed CVEs, all the six fuzzing
strategies discover nearly the same number of vulnerabilities
on mp3gain and bmp2tiff, while they do not find any
discovered vulnerability on mpg123, mpg321, sam2p and
mp42aac. Since there is no published CVEs for ps2ts
or tstools, no strategy finds any discovered CVE on
ps2ts. Only SmartSeed finds a discovered vulnerability
on magick, while others do not find any crash. Although
the number of discovered CVEs on mp3gain found by
random and AFL-result is one less than the others, they
perform pretty well on discovering the found CVEs on exiv2
and find two more than others. As a conclusion, all the six
strategies perform close on discovering the existed CVEs,
with SmartSeed, random and AFL-result find the most,
while others find one or two fewer.
(2) For undiscovered CVEs, SmartSeed finds 16 undis-
covered vulnerabilities, which is six more than the second
most number discovered by random and AFL-result.
However, the number of undiscovered CVEs found by
peachset, hotset and AFL-cmin is 7, 8 and 7, respec-
tively. SmartSeed performs pretty well on mp3gain, for
which it finds three more undiscovered vulnerabilities than
others. Only AFL-result finds an undiscovered CVE on
bmp2tiff and another on ps2ts that are not discovered by
SmartSeed.
In summary, SmartSeed performs the best on finding
both discovered and undiscovered vulnerabilities. In total, we
discover 23 CVEs from the 1,096 unique crashes found by
SmartSeed (including 6 more undiscovered CVEs than oth-
ers). Although peachset, hotset and AFL-cmin require
more time to select seed files and discover more crashes than
the baseline random, they yield the worst performance on
finding unique vulnerabilities, which is unexpected.
IV. FURTHER ANALYSIS
To figure out the reasons why SmartSeed performs better
than other seed selection strategies, we employ t-SNE [30],
which is one of the best dimensionality reduction algorithms
that can aggregate similar data together, to visualize the
distribution. We analyze the similar distribution of the input
seeds generated by different seed selection strategies and the
mutated files from these seeds, which is a new angle to
understand the fuzzing performance (more details are given
in the Supplementary File).
A. Execution Count
For most, if not all, of existing popular coverage-based
greybox fuzzing tools like AFL, they are designed to prioritize
mutating the seed files that are executed fast. Such design is
based on the intuition that a fast-executed seed is more likely
to be mutated into input files that are also executed fast, and
thus, more tests can be conducted on the objective application
within a fixed time, followed by more potential crashes might
be found. To measure the execution speed of a seed set (or
input files on average), we may use the execution count, which
is defined as the number of testing/execution times conducted
by the fuzzing tool within a time period. Evidently, a larger
execution count implies more input files can be mutated from
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TABLE VI
VULNERABILITIES FOUND BY SIX FUZZING STRATEGIES.
SmartSeed + AFL random + AFL AFL-result + AFL peachset + AFL hotset + AFL AFL-cmin + AFL
mp3gain CVE-2017-12911;
CVE-2017-14406;
CVE-2017-14410;
CVE-2018-10781(+);
CVE-2018-10783(+);
CVE-2018-10784(+);
CVE-2018-10782(+);
CVE-2018-10777(+);
CVE-2017-12911;
CVE-2017-14410;
CVE-2018-10781(+);
CVE-2018-10783(+);
CVE-2017-12911;
CVE-2017-14410;
CVE-2018-10783(+);
CVE-2017-12911;
CVE-2017-14407;
CVE-2017-14410;
CVE-2017-12911;
CVE-2017-14407;
CVE-2017-14410;
CVE-2018-10777(+);
CVE-2017-12911;
CVE-2017-14407;
CVE-2017-14410;
mpg123 CVE-2018-10789(+);
mpg321 CVE-2018-10786(+); CVE-2018-10786(+); CVE-2018-10786(+); CVE-2018-10786(+); CVE-2018-10786(+); CVE-2018-10786(+);
magick CVE-2017-11754;
bmp2tiff CVE-2014-9330;
CVE-2018-10779(+);
CVE-2014-9330;
CVE-2018-10779(+);
CVE-2014-9330;
CVE-2018-10779(+);
CVE-2018-10801(+);
CVE-2014-9330;
CVE-2018-10779(+);
CVE-2014-9330;
CVE-2018-10779(+);
CVE-2014-9330;
CVE-2018-10779(+);
exiv2 CVE-2017-14861;
CVE-2017-17723;
CVE-2018-10780(+);
CVE-2017-11339;
CVE-2017-14861;
CVE-2017-17723;
CVE-2018-9145;
CVE-2017-11339;
CVE-2017-14861;
CVE-2017-14863;
CVE-2017-17723;
CVE-2017-14861;
CVE-2017-17723;
CVE-2017-14861;
CVE-2017-17723;
CVE-2017-14861;
sam2p CVE-2018-10792(+);
CVE-2018-10793(+);
CVE-2018-10792(+); CVE-2018-10792(+); CVE-2018-10792(+); CVE-2018-10792(+); CVE-2018-10792(+);
ps2ts CVE-2018-10787(+);
CVE-2018-10788(+);
CVE-2018-10787(+);
CVE-2018-10788(+);
CVE-2018-10787(+);
CVE-2018-10802(+);
CVE-2018-10787(+);
CVE-2018-10788(+);
CVE-2018-10787(+);
CVE-2018-10788(+);
CVE-2018-10787(+);
CVE-2018-10788(+);
mp42aac CVE-2018-10791(+);
CVE-2018-10790(+);
CVE-2018-10785(+);
CVE-2018-10791(+);
CVE-2018-10790(+);
CVE-2018-10785(+);
CVE-2018-10791(+);
CVE-2018-10790(+);
CVE-2018-10785(+);
CVE-2018-10791(+);
CVE-2018-10790(+);
CVE-2018-10791(+);
CVE-2018-10790(+);
CVE-2018-10791(+);
CVE-2018-10790(+);
the seeds to test the application and faster execution speed on
average for each input file.
Now, under the same settings as the experiments in Table
III, we analyze the execution count of the seeds generated by
SmartSeed and state-of-the-art seed selection strategies. The
results are shown in Table VII. Considering the results in Ta-
bles III and VII together, we find that: although SmartSeed
+ AFL is the most effective strategy in most of the evaluation
scenarios with respect to discovering both crashes and paths,
it does not have the largest execution count in most of the
cases, i.e., SmartSeed + AFL discovers more crashes and
paths using fewer input files. For instance, SmartSeed +
AFL is the only strategy that discovers crashes on magick
while its execution count is the least one. Therefore, based
on the results in Tables III and VII, we conclude that there
is no explicit correlation between the execution count and the
number of crashes and paths being discovered.
The above analysis leads to an interesting insight. It might
be a misunderstanding that seed files with faster execution
speed can discover more unique crashes or paths. Although
these seeds can generate more files and test the objective
application more times, most of generated files may execute
the known paths and thus may discover nothing. Therefore,
valuable seeds are more desired for efficient fuzzing rather
than fast-executed ones.
B. Generation Analysis
For genetic algorithm based fuzzing, we usually use gener-
ation to measure the mutation/generation-relationship between
an input file and the seed files. For instance, the generation of
the initial seed files is “1”, the files that are mutated/generated
from the seed files have a generation of “2”, and similarly, the
files that are mutated/generated from the files with generation
k have a generation of k+1.
Then, under the same settings as the experiments in Table
III, we show the largest generation number among all the
generated files of each seed strategy in Table VII. Considering
the results in Tables III and VII together, we find that in
general, a large achieved generation implies a better coverage
performance. In 11 of the evaluated 12 applications except for
avconv, the most unique paths are discovered by the fuzzing
strategy that has the largest or the second largest generation.
For instance, the largest achieved generation of SmartSeed
is much larger than other seed generation/selection strategies
on mp3gain, mpg123, magick, bmp2tiff, sam2p and
mp42aac, and meanwhile, SmartSeed has a better coverage
performance on these applications.
Therefore, based on our results and analysis, we have
another interesting insight: it is very likely that there is a
positive correlation between the largest achieved generation
and the coverage performance of seed strategies. This can
explain the significant coverage improvement of SmartSeed.
Note that many researchers do a lot of work to increase the
coverage in order to find more crashes. Now we learn the fact
that a better seed set can also improve the coverage.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we make some discussions on SmartSeed
starting from the three proposed heuristic questions in Section
I. Then, we remark the limitation and future work of this paper.
Q1: Can we generate valuable seeds in a fast and
effective manner? From Table II, the seed generation process
of SmartSeed is linearly scalable and fast. It only takes
tens of seconds to generate sufficient seed files for popular
fuzzing tools. Furthermore, as we evaluated in Section III,
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TABLE VII
EXECUTION COUNT AND GENERATION OF EACH OBJECTIVE APPLICATION UNDER DIFFERENT FUZZING STRATEGIES.
execution count
/generation
mp3 bmp flv
mp3gain ffmpeg mpg123 mpg321 magick bmp2tiff exiv2 sam2p avconv flvmeta ps2ts mp42aac
Smartseed + AFL 39.9M/15 12M/2 49.5M/26 50.5M/22 6.5M/11 3.8M/8 45.9M/14 4.5M/8 20.7M/3 498.1M/27 340M/23 26.7M/21
random + AFL 34.5M/3 22.9M/3 56.1M/3 40.1M/26 24.8M/3 41.5M/3 57.5M/14 33.9M/3 20.5M/3 338.9M/17 231M/21 5.2M/17
AFL-result + AFL 32M/3 14.7M/3 58.5M/3 37.7M/10 15.7M/2 25.8M/4 73.2M/22 74.3M/3 11.7M/3 454.7M/27 366M/21 9.4M/18
peachset + AFL 55.7M/3 8.9M/2 45.2M/3 47.1M/13 21.7M/3 37.5M/4 27.7M/16 44.5M/3 13.3M/3 441.7M/27 228M/22 10.9M/19
hotset + AFL 59.9M/3 9.4M/2 80.2M/3 42.4M/4 24.1M/4 32.2M/4 34.8M/18 56.3M/3 11.8M/3 421.3M/25 152M/20 1.9M/13
AFL-cmin + AFL 38.4M/3 9.7M/2 66.9M/3 61.8M/4 16.8M/3 48.5M/3 61.3M/9 41.9M/2 17.8M/3 664.3M/29 343M/23 3.1M/13
SmartSeed significantly outperforms existing state-of-the-
art seed selection strategies when fuzzing multiple kinds of
practical applications. Therefore, as expected, SmartSeed
can generate effective seeds in a fast and effective manner.
Q2: Can we generate valuable seeds in a robust manner?
As shown in Section II, SmartSeed is designed as a generic
system to generate valuable seeds for applications without
of requiring highly-structured formats. We also implement
this system to generate seeds for applications with differ-
ent formats. As shown in Section III, once the generative
model of SmartSeed is constructed, it can be employed
to fuzz many applications with the same/similar format, and
meanwhile, its performance significantly outperforms state-
of-the-art seed selection techniques. Therefore, based on our
evaluation, SmartSeed can generate valuable seeds in a
robust manner.
Q3: Can we generate valuable seeds in a compatible
manner? As shown in Section III, SmartSeed is easily
compatible with existing popular fuzzing tools. Furthermore,
their fuzzing performance can also be improved in most of the
scenarios. Therefore, SmartSeed is easily extendable and
compatible.
Due to the space limitations, we show the limitation and
future work of this paper in the Supplementary File.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a novel unsupervised learning
system named SmartSeed to generate valuable input seed
files for fuzzing. Compared with state-of-the-art seed selection
strategies, SmartSeed discovers 608 extra unique crashes
and 5,040 extra unique paths when we use AFL to fuzz 12
open source applications with different input formats. Then,
we combine SmartSeed with different fuzzing tools. The
evaluation results demonstrate that SmartSeed is easily com-
patible and meanwhile very effective. To further understand
the performance of SmartSeed, we make more analysis
on the seeds generated by SmartSeed and present several
interesting findings to enlighten our knowledge on effective
fuzzing. What’s more, we find 23 unique vulnerabilities on
9 applications by SmartSeed and have obtained CVE IDs
for 16 undiscovered ones. Finally, we will open source the
SmartSeed system, which is expected to facilitate future
fuzzing research.
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VII. NUMBER OF SEEDS VS. FUZZING PERFORMANCE
Now, we examine the relationship between the number of
seed files and the fuzzing effectiveness. We use the same
virtual machines with an Intel i7 CPU, 4.5GB memory and
a Ubuntu 16.04 LTS system to run each fuzzing process for
72 hours. The results are shown in Table VIII, from which we
can learn the following observations.
(1) Because mutation-based fuzzing tools such as AFL
use byte flipping and so on to mutate files, the variation of
the mutated files is slight and slow. Therefore, the fuzzing
performance will be influenced if the number of seeds is
too small due to the lack of seeds’ diversity. Then, a proper
number of seeds should be bigger than the lower bound. Since
the performance of all the three fuzzing strategies are not
obviously getting worse when the number of seeds in the initial
set is 50, we come to a conclusion that 50 or more seeds is
enough to bootstrap these fuzzing tools.
(2) In regard to the discovery of unique crashes, for
mpg321, SmartSeed and AFL-result perform the best
when the number of seeds is 50, while random discovers
the most crashes when the seed number is 200. SmartSeed
and AFL-result discover the most crashes on sam2p
when the seed number is 100, while random finds the most
unique crashes on sam2p with 300 seeds. For mp42aac,
SmartSeed finds the most crashes when the seed number
is 50. random and AFL-result discover the most crashes
when the number of seeds is 300 and 100, respectively. There-
fore, it seems that there is no obvious relationship between the
number of discovered crashes and the number of seeds when
there are enough seeds.
(3) As for the discovery of unique paths, for mpg321,
SmartSeed finds the most paths when the number of
seeds is 100, while random and AFL-result discover
the most paths when they have 50 seeds. When fuzzing
sam2p, SmartSeed finds the most paths with 200 seeds,
while random uses 50 seeds to discover the most paths.
AFL-result finds the most paths when the number of
seeds is 100. For mp42aac, SmartSeed, random and
AFL-result find the most paths when the number of seeds
is 50, 200 and 100, respectively. It seems that if the number
of the initial seeds is too big, the number of discovered paths
will decrease rarely. We conjecture the reason is that the initial
seeds detect more unique paths, and thus, the discovered paths
later will be fewer. Therefore, it is a negligible relationship
between the number of seeds in the initial set and the number
of discovered paths. Note that it is hard to say 100 is a big
number for the number of seeds in the initial set.
In summary, it seems 50 seeds in the initial seed set is
enough to guide the fuzzing tools to detect crashes and paths,
while there is no evident relationship between the number of
seeds and the fuzzing performance. Therefore, it is OK to use
100 seeds as the initial seed set in the main body of our paper.
VIII. FURTHER ANALYSIS
A. Distribution
We would like to examine the distribution of the seeds
generated by different strategies, and the distribution of the
valuable files mutated from those seeds that trigger crashes.
To facilitate our analysis, we employ t-SNE [30], which
is one of the best dimensionality reduction algorithms that
can aggregate similar data together, to visualize the dis-
tribution. Specifically, we use SmartSeed, random and
AFL-result to generate 300 seeds, respectively, and then
visualize the distribution of these seeds in Fig. 6. Here, note
that (1) the seeds of AFL-result are selected from the
stored files of AFL that can trigger crashes or new paths,
which are actually the mutated files of the random’s seeds
using AFL as we described before (the default seed selection
strategy of AFL is random in our implementation); and (2)
we do not consider peachset, hotset, and AFL-cmin.
This is mainly because similar to random, the seeds generated
by these three schemes highly depend on the initial seed source
dataset. It turns out that the seeds obtained by them exhibit
similar distribution as random. Thus, we do not plot their
distribution in Fig. 6 in order to make it more readable. From
Fig. 6, we have the following observations.
(1) Although AFL-result is mutated from random, its
distribution is far away from random. In other words, it
takes time for random to discover valuable input files that
trigger crashes or new paths. Compared with the distribution
of random, the distribution of SmartSeed is closer to
AFL-result. This implies that SmartSeed can discover
crashes and paths faster than random.
(2) From Fig. 6, we learn that the distribution of
AFL-result is more decentralized. Compared with
AFL-result, the distribution of SmartSeed is more
intensive. SmartSeed is also closer to the main part
of AFL-result. These facts indicate that: when using
AFL-result to fuzz an application, an input file may spend
a longer time to be mutated into another valuable input file
because of the discrete distribution. By contrast, SmartSeed
may be mutated fast into the main part of valuable input
files that can trigger crashes and paths of the objective appli-
cation. Thus, SmartSeed is more effective compared with
AFL-result.
Then, we leverage t-SNE to analyze the valuable mu-
tated files of SmartSeed + AFL, random + AFL and
AFL-result + AFL, i.e., the files are mutated from
the seeds of SmartSeed, random and AFL-result
that trigger unique crashes of objective applications. Since
SmartSeed discovers more crashes than random and
AFL-result, its points are more than those two. Note that
the distribution of valuable files discovered by SmartSeed
will only be more sparse if we use the same number of files
to plot. The results are shown in Fig. 7, from which we have
the following observations.
(1) The distribution of valuable files mutated from
AFL-result and random are similar. Also, it seems diffi-
cult for the seeds of AFL-result and random to be mutated
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TABLE VIII
UNIQUE CRASHES AND PATHS OF EACH OBJECTIVE APPLICATION WHEN USING DIFFERENT NUMBER OF FILES AS THE INITIAL SEED SET TO FUZZ.
number SmartSeed + AFL random + AFL AFL-result + AFLunique crashes unique paths unique crashes unique paths unique crashes unique paths
mpg321
50 231 1,029 48 784 25 329
100 204 1,060 40 766 13 187
200 164 1,051 66 565 10 126
300 181 1,023 24 608 9 104
sam2p
50 37 1,358 23 559 21 404
100 50 1,322 21 468 36 719
200 49 1,392 27 458 30 372
300 48 1,373 28 494 34 357
mp42aac
50 176 1,226 76 560 75 441
100 118 658 80 329 102 585
200 108 879 83 626 31 340
300 106 502 91 520 53 473
random
AFL-result
(a) mp3 (b) bmp
random
AFL-result
(c) flv
random
AFL-result
Fig. 6. Similarity distribution of the seeds of SmartSeed, random and AFL-result.
(a) mp3
random + AFL
AFL-result + AFL
(b) bmp
random + AFL
AFL-result + AFL
(c) flv
random + AFL
AFL-result + AFL
Fig. 7. Similarity distribution of valuable mutated input files of SmartSeed, random and AFL-result that triggered crashes.
into the distant points that can trigger crashes, which then
limits their fuzzing performance.
(2) On the contrary, the points of the valuable mutated files
of SmartSeed spread in a larger area. This demonstrates
that the seed files generated by SmartSeed are easier to be
mutated into the discrete valuable input files that can trigger
crashes.
(3) We can learn from Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 that although
the distributions of AFL-result and random are more
discrete than SmartSeed, the valuable input files discovered
by SmartSeed, which trigger unique crashes of objec-
tive applications, cover a larger area. In other words, the
relatively-concentrate distribution of the seeds generated by
SmartSeed does not limit them to be mutated into discrete
input files and trigger more unique crashes.
In summary, the distribution of SmartSeed is dense and
closer to the main part of AFL-result. Meanwhile, the
seeds of SmartSeed seem easier to be mutated into valuable
input files that can trigger crashes. These observations may
explain the better performance of SmartSeed from another
angle.
IX. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK.
As the focus of this paper, SmartSeed in its current form
is designed for genetic algorithm based fuzzing. Therefore,
it is not suitable to use SmartSeed for generating highly-
structured input files. We take this issue as the future work
of this paper and keep extending our system. From the per-
formance perspective, SmartSeed could be improved from
many aspects. For instance, a better generative model could be
designed. Also, it is interesting to study the best working scope
of different generative models and how to further improve the
model training process. From the evaluation perspective, our
primary goal in this paper is to demonstrate the performance
and usability of SmartSeed. Certainly, more evaluations can
be conducted to comprehensively evaluate SmartSeed, e.g.,
considering more applications and more formats.
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X. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly introduce the related work.
Mutation-based Fuzzing. As a representative of mutation-
based fuzzing, AFL [11] employs a novel type of compile-
time instrumentation and genetic algorithms to automatically
discover the valuable input files that trigger new paths or
unique crashes. Because of its high-efficiency and ease of use,
AFL is one of the most popular fuzzing tools. Based on AFL,
Bo¨hme et al. presented a fuzzing tool named AFLFast that
can detect more paths by prioritizing low-frequency paths [2].
In [35], Bo¨hme et al. combined a simulated annealing-based
power schedule scheme with AFL and presented AFLGo. Xu
et al. implemented three new operating primitives specialized
for improving the fuzzing performance of large-scale tasks
on multi-core machines [37]. In [31], Gan et al. presented a
solution to mitigate path collisions, which can be combined
with AFL and AFLFast to construct CollAFL and CollAFL-
fast, respectively.
Many other works focus on combining fuzzing with other
bug detection technologies such as taint tracing, symbolic
execution and program analysis. Wang et al. combined fuzzing
with dynamic taint analysis and symbolic execution techniques
and presented a fuzzing tool named TaintScope [17]. Haller
et al. presented a fuzzing tool named Dowser, which takes
taint tracking, program analysis and symbolic execution into
consideration [7]. Sang et al. considered to employ white-box
symbolic analysis in their fuzzing tool design [4]. Stephens et
al. also considered to involve selective symbolic execution into
their fuzzing tool named Driller [5]. Pham et al. combined
input model-based approaches with symbolic execution and
presented Model-based Whitebox Fuzzing (MoWF) [18].
To improve the coverage, Rawat et al. presented an
application-aware evolutionary fuzzing tool named VUzzer
[3]. VUzzer uses static and dynamic analysis to analyze the
priority of paths. In [39], Peng et al. presented T-Fuzz, which
uses a dynamic tracing based technique to detect and remove
the checks in objective applications to improve the code
coverage. By using scalable byte-level taint tracking, context-
sensitive branch count, gradient descent based search, shape
and type inference and input length exploration to solve path
constraints, Angora presented by Chen et al. can increase the
branch coverage of objective applications [40].
Note that SmartSeed is designed as a generic system
to generate valuable seed files for and to be easily compat-
ible with mutation-based fuzzing. With the seeds generated
by SmartSeed, we expect to improve the performance of
mutation-based fuzzing.
Generation-based Fuzzing. Generation-based fuzzing tools
are designed to generate input files with specific input formats.
Following this track, Godefroid et al. used the grammar-based
specification of valid highly-structured input files to improve
the performance of fuzzing [15]. Holler et al. presented Lang-
Fuzz to fuzz the applications with highly-structured inputs
such as JavaScript interpreters [19]. In order to fuzz compilers
and interpreters, Dewey et al. proposed to use Constraint
Logic Programming (CLP) for the program generation [20].
Recently, Wang et al. presented a novel data-driven seed
generation approach named Skyfire [6], which uses Probabilis-
tic Context-Sensitive Grammar (PCSG) to learn the syntax
features and semantic rules from the training set. In [26],
Godefroid et.al. presented a RNN-based machine-learning
technique to generate highly-structured format files such as
PDF. The method not only can pass the format checks with a
high probability, but also can improve the code coverage.
The primary difference between SmartSeed and
generation-based fuzzing approaches is that our method is
used to generate binary seed files such as image, music and
video, while they focus on improving the fuzzing efficiency
of applications with highly-structured input formats.
Other Fuzzing Strategies. As for kernel vulnerabilities,
Corina et al. presented an interface-aware fuzzing tool named
DIFUZE to automatically generate inputs for kernel drivers
[36]. Han et al. proposed a novel method called model-based
API fuzzing and presented IMF for testing commodity OS
kernels [38]. You et al. presented a novel technique named
SemFuzz [41] that can learn from vulnerability-related texts
such as CVE reports and automatically generate Proof-of-
Concept (PoC) exploits. Petsios et al. focused on algorithmic
complexity vulnerabilities and proposed SlowFuzz to generate
inputs to trigger the maximal resource utilization behavior of
applications and algorithms [42].
Seed Selection. To figure out how to select a better initial
seed set, Allen and Foote presented an algorithm to consider
the parameter selection and automated selection of seed files
[25]. Woo et al. developed a framework to evaluate 26 random-
ized online scheduling algorithms to see which can schedule
better seeds to fuzz a program [24]. Rebert et al. evaluated
six seed selection strategies of fuzzing and presented several
interesting conclusions about seed sets [1]. They also showed
the necessity to select a good seed set to improve the efficiency
of fuzzing. Recently, Nichols et.al. showed that using the
generated files of GAN to reinitialize AFL can potentially find
more unique paths of ethkey [27]. However, they neither
described the model in detail nor provided any prototype.
Thus, we cannot reproduce their model and compare it with
SmartSeed.
Different from existing research, we focus on designing
a generic seed generation system leveraging start-of-the-art
machine learning techniques. We also demonstrate its ef-
fectiveness, robustness and compatibility through extensive
experiments.
GAN Models. In 2014, Goodfellow et al. presented a new
unsupervised learning framework named Generative Adver-
sarial Networks (GAN) [8]. To improve GAN, Radford et
al. tried multiple combinations of machine learning models
to construct better generative and discriminative models for
GAN, and presented the Deep Convolutional GAN (DCGAN)
model [9]. Later, Zhai et al. combined GAN with an Energy
Based Model (EBM) and proposed VGAN that works by
minimizing a variational lower bound of the negative log
likelihood of EBM [33]. Chen et al. combined GAN with
mutual information and presented InfoGAN [34], which can
unsupervisedly learn interpretable representations. Recently,
Arjovsky et al. presented the Wasserstein GAN (WGAN)
model by using the approximation of the Wasserstein distance
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as the loss function [10].
Since GAN and its variants can use unsupervised learning
methods to generated more realistic data, they have been
applied in many applications such as high-quality image
generation [43], [44], [45] and image translation [46], [47],
[48]. In this paper, we extend the application of GAN to
improve the performance of fuzzing.
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